Europe and Russia Unit 4 Guided Reading Pdf

Russia's Possible Invasion of Ukraine

CSIS Briefs

January 13, 2022

The Issue

If peace talks neglect, the Russian military has several options to accelerate into Ukraine through northern, central, and southern invasion routes. Just a Russian attempt to seize and hold territory will not necessarily be easy and will likely be impacted past challenges from conditions, urban combat, command and control, logistics, and the morale of Russian troops and the Ukrainian population. The Usa and its European allies and partners should be prepared for an invasion by taking immediate economic, diplomatic, military, intelligence, and humanitarian steps to help Ukraine and its population and shore up defenses forth the North Atlantic Treaty System'southward (NATO) eastern flank.

Introduction

Russian president Vladimir Putin continues to threaten an invasion of Ukraine with a major military buildup well-nigh the Russian-Ukrainian border and aggressive language. Russian federation has deployed offensive weapons and systems within striking altitude of Ukraine, including chief battle tanks, self-propelled howitzers, infantry fighting vehicles, multiple launch rocket systems, Iskander curt-range ballistic missile systems, and towed artillery, as highlighted in Figures 1a and 1b. Putin has complemented this buildup with blunt language that Ukraine is historically part of Russia and that Kiev needs to return to the Russian fold.^one Russian federation'south threat is particularly alarming for at to the lowest degree two reasons. First, Russia could movement its pre-positioned forces into Ukraine quickly. If fully committed, the Russian military is significantly stronger and more capable than Ukraine'southward armed forces, and the Us and other NATO countries take fabricated it articulate they will non deploy their forces to Ukraine to repel a Russian invasion. Fifty-fifty if diplomats reach an agreement, Putin has shown a willingness to punch up—and down—the state of war in Ukraine and threaten to expand the war, making the Russian threat persistent. Second, an invasion would marking a significant alter in international politics, creating a new "Fe Curtain" that begins along Russia's borders with Finland and the Baltic states and moves south through Eastern Europe, the Centre Due east, Key and Due south Asia, and finally to East Asia along China'south southern flank.

Consequently, information technology is important to sympathize how Russia could invade Ukraine, how specific political objectives may influence an invasion plan, the challenges an invasion may face, and what options the United States and its European partners have to respond. To help empathize these dynamics, this cursory asks several questions. What are Russian president Vladimir Putin'south objectives? What military options does Russian federation have, and what might an invasion expect like? How should the United States and its allies and partners reply?

The brief makes two chief arguments. Kickoff, if Russia decides to invade Ukraine to reassert Russian control and influence, there are at least three possible axes of accelerate to seize Ukrainian territory: a northern thrust, maybe attempting to outflank Ukrainian defenses effectually Kiev past approaching through Belarus; a central thrust advancing due west into Ukraine; and a southern thrust advancing across the Perekop isthmus. Second, if the United states of america and its European partners neglect to deter a Russian invasion, they should back up Ukrainian resistance through a combination of diplomatic, armed services, intelligence, and other means. The United States and its European partners cannot allow Russia to annex Ukraine. The West'south appeasement of Moscow when it annexed Crimea in 2014 and so orchestrated an insurgency in Eastern Ukraine only emboldened Russian leaders. In addition, Russian annexation of some or all of Ukraine would increase Russian manpower, industrial capacity, and natural resources to a level that could make it a global threat. The United States and Europe cannot make this mistake again.

The balance of this brief is divided into three main sections. First, information technology examines Russian political objectives. Second, the brief analyzes Russian armed forces options. Third, it explores options available to the United States and its allies and partners.

Figure 1a: Russian Military Buildup near Yelnya, Russia

Effigy 1b: Close-Upwardly of Russian Military Buildup near Yelnya, Russia

Russian Political Objectives

The Kremlin wants what it says: an cease to NATO expansion, a rollback of previous expansion, a removal of American nuclear weapons from Europe, and a Russian sphere of influence. Nevertheless, Putin may take less. The Kremlin's primary goal is a guarantee that Belarus, Ukraine, and Georgia volition never vest to a military or economic bloc other than the ones Moscow controls and that Russia will be the ultimate arbitrator of the foreign and security policy of all three states. In essence, this conflict is about whether 30 years after the demise of the Soviet Union, its one-time ethnic republics can live as independent, sovereign states or if they nonetheless must acknowledge Moscow as their de facto sovereign.

Ostensibly, the demand for an exclusive sphere of influence in Eastern Europe and the south Caucasus is to meet Russian security interests. The Kremlin has portrayed NATO expansion to the due east as the original sin of post-Soviet international relations with the Westward that now must be rectified. Facts, alternate interpretations, and the security concerns of equally sovereign nations notwithstanding, Moscow claims that without such guarantees, it will use military forcefulness to protect its security interests.

Russian Military Options

Based on these political objectives, the Kremlin has at least six possible military options:

1. Redeploy some of its footing forces away from the Ukrainian border—at least temporarily—if negotiations are successful but continue to aid pro-Russian rebels in Eastern Ukraine.

ii. Send conventional Russian troops into the breakaway regions of Donetsk and Luhansk equally unilateral "peacekeepers" and pass up to withdraw them until peace talks end successfully and Kiev agrees to implement the Minsk Accords.

iii. Seize Ukrainian territory as far west as the Dnepr River to use as a bargaining chip or comprise this new territory fully into the Russian federation. This pick is represented in Effigy 2a.

4. Seize Ukrainian territory upwards to the Dnepr River and seize an additional belt of country (to include Odessa) that connects Russian territory with the breakaway Transdniestria Republic and separates Ukraine from any access to the Blackness Ocean. The Kremlin would contain these new lands into Russia and ensure that the rump Ukrainian statelet remains economically unviable.

v. Seize only a belt of land between Russia and Transdniestria (including Mariupol, Kherson, and Odessa) to secure freshwater supplies for Crimea and block Ukraine's admission to the sea, while avoiding major combat over Kiev and Kharkiv. This option is represented in Figure 2b.

half-dozen. Seize all of Ukraine and, with Republic of belarus, announce the germination of a new tripartite Slavic wedlock of Slap-up, Little, and White Russians (Russians, Ukrainians, and Belarusians). This choice would involve operations represented in Figure 2a as "stage one," with Figure 2c representing "phase two" of this choice.

Of these 6 options, the commencement ii are the least probable to incur pregnant international sanctions but accept express chance of achieving a quantum on either NATO issues or the Minsk Accords due to their coercive nature. All other options bring major international sanctions and economic hardship and would be counterproductive to the goal of weakening NATO or decoupling the United states of america from its commitments to European security.

Options three through half dozen could achieve some other goal—the destruction of an independent Ukraine—whose evolution toward a liberal democratic state has get a major source of contention among the Kremlin'southward security elites. Option 3 would have Russia control a substantial amount of Ukrainian territory just still leave it as an economically feasible land. Option iv leaves only an agrarian rump Ukraine but precludes occupying its most nationalistic areas. Choice five leaves more than of Ukraine gratuitous but nonetheless cuts its access to the body of water and incurs fewer occupation costs. Options four and five—seizing a belt of land from Tiraspol to Mariupol—are complicated past the fact that there is no east-west running natural feature, river, or mountain range that could serve every bit a natural line of demarcation for this occupied land. The new border along this territory would run beyond countless fields and forests and be difficult to defend. Option 6 means occupying the entire country and dealing with the absorption of a population of 41 million that may resist occupation actively and passively for years. It would require an occupation force of considerable size to control the population and man the new borders with NATO countries. Ukrainians in any occupied territory tin can await forced Russification that the nation experienced under such rulers as Catherine the Great, Alexander 2, Stalin, and Brezhnev.

Possible Invasion Routes

Ideological grooming of Russian society for a disharmonize with Ukraine has been ongoing since at least 2014, with Kremlin propaganda portraying Ukraine as a proto-fascist, neo-Nazi country. In July 2021, a public letter by President Putin asserted that Russians and Ukrainians are the aforementioned people and castigated Ukraine's authorities for justifying independence by denying its by.^two The Russian military made President Putin's article compulsory reading for its soldiers.³ This was followed in October by a alphabetic character in the newspaper Kommersant by Russian Security Council vice-president Dmitry Medvedev, which used antisemitic tones to delegitimize the current Ukrainian leadership as extremist, corrupt, and foreign controlled.^iv

With an ideological basis for action in place, the next step is to create a casus belli—justification for war—consistent with the Kremlin-manufactured image of Ukraine. Pretexts for an attack could range from a straightforward breakdown of security talks to a stage-managed incident similar to the provocations at Mukden, Gleiwitz, and Mainila that provided justification for Japan's invasion of Manchuria, Germany's invasion of Poland, and the Soviet Union's set on on Finland, respectively. This is why the baroque claim of Defense force Minister Sergey Shoigu posted on the Kremlin's official website of American mercenaries preparing a "provocation" with chemic weapons in Ukraine is ominous and might foreshadow just the type of "incident" the Kremlin would ready.^v

Once there is a casus belli, cyberattacks will likely follow to degrade Ukraine's military command and control systems and public communications and electrical grids. Next, kinetic operations volition likely begin with air and missile strikes against Ukraine'south air force and air defense force systems. In one case air superiority is established, Russian regular army would move forwards, slightly preceded past special operations to degrade further command and command capabilities and delay the mobilization of reserves by conducting bombings, assassinations, and sabotage operations.

The scheme of maneuver of a Russian military machine invasion of Ukraine volition likely be influenced by which of the above political goals the Kremlin wishes to achieve, the geography of the state and cities to be fought over, and the transportation routes to bring up logistics. If the Kremlin wishes to exercise options three, four, or six, and taking into consideration principal geography and logistics, there are three likely axes of advance to seize Ukrainian territory east of the Dnepr River, with the river as either a limit of advance or the first phase line of a larger invasion.

Northern Route: Russian federation could advance toward Kiev along 2 routes. The first would be 150 miles past road through Novye Yurkovichi, Russia; Chernihiv, Ukraine; and into Kiev, Ukraine. The 2nd would exist a 200-mile thrust through Troebortnoe, Russia; Konotop, Ukraine; Nizhyn, Ukraine; and into Kiev.^vi If Minsk were to accede to the use of its road and rail networks, the Russian army could outflank Ukrainian defenses effectually Kiev and approach them from the rear via a 150-mile axis of advance from Mazur, Republic of belarus, to Korosten, Ukraine, and finally to Kiev.

Fundamental Road: Russian federation could as well advance due west forth three routes. The first might include a 200-mile axis that moves through Belgorod, Russia; Kharkiv, Ukraine; Poltava, Ukraine; and finally to Kremenchuk, Ukraine. The 2d might include a 140-mile axis thrust through Donetsk, Ukraine to Zaporizhzhia, Ukraine; and perchance also another thrust from Donetsk to Dnipro, Ukraine. The 3rd might involve Russian forces advancing along the coastline toward Mariupol, Berdyansk, and the Perekop isthmus connecting Crimea to Ukraine.

Southern Route: Russia could also advance across the Perekop isthmus to take Kherson and the source of freshwater for Crimea and simultaneously toward the vicinity of Melitopol to link up with Russian forces advancing along the coast of the Sea of Azov. If Russia was to attempt option five, this would be the main assail coupled with the assail along the coastline toward Mariupol and Berdyansk. But it would be hardest to sustain logistically due to the lack of a railway running along the Sea of Azov coast and the master direction of advance.

Figure 2 highlights possible invasion routes. All of these routes, except the coastal one, parallel existing rails lines. This is essential since Russian regular army logistics forces are not designed for big-calibration ground offensives far from railroads.⁷ If Russia's objectives include denying Ukraine future admission to the sea, it will accept to seize Odessa. Some predict that this would exist accomplished via amphibious and airborne landings near Odessa, which link up with mechanized forces approaching from the eastward. If Russia intends to conquer the entire country, its forces would need to seize Odessa (whose port facilities would ease Russian logistics) and also cross the Dnepr River at several points to march and fight an additional 350 to 700 miles further west to occupy all of Ukraine up to its borders with Poland, Slovakia, Republic of hungary, Romania, and Moldova.

Figure 2: Possible Russian Invasion Routes

Russian Prospects of Success

Mechanized attacks are not e'er as rapid as attackers promise. Two of the quickest movements of armored forces in history—German general Heinz Guderian'due south punch through the Ardennes and seizure of Dunkirk in May 1940, and the U.S. and coalition advance from the Kuwait border to Baghdad in 2003—each averaged approximately 20 miles per twenty-four hours. Move confronting a determined foe in winter weather with limited daylight could reduce that rate of advance significantly.

With plenty troops, firepower, logistics, fourth dimension, and national will, as well equally no outside interference, Russian federation could grind forward until its military achieves the Kremlin's political objectives. Russia's armed services outnumbers Ukraine's military machine in the air and on the ground, Russia gained all-encompassing feel in conducting combined-arms operations in Syria, and the terrain favors offensive mechanized warfare. However, the true adding of military success can only be taken afterward a clash of artillery begins. In addition, there are several intangibles—such as weather condition, urban gainsay, control and command, logistics, and morale—that may play a meaning office in the initial stages of a war.

Atmospheric condition: An invasion that begins in January or February would have the advantage of frozen ground to back up the cross-country movement of a large mechanized force. It would also hateful operating in conditions of freezing cold and limited visibility. January is usually the coldest and snowiest month of the yr in Ukraine, averaging 8.5 hours of daylight during the month and increasing to 10 hours by February.⁸ This would put a premium on night fighting capabilities to proceed an advance moving forrard. Should fighting go on into March, mechanized forces would have to deal with the infamous Rasputitsa, or thaw. In October, Rasputitsa turns business firm basis into mud. In March, the frozen steppes thaw, and the state again becomes at best a bog, and at worst a sea of mud. Wintertime atmospheric condition is also less than optimal for reliable close air support operations.

Urban Gainsay: While much of the terrain east of the Dnepr River includes rural fields and forests, there are several major urban areas that a Russian mechanized force would have to either have or bypass and congregate. Kiev has about iii million inhabitants, Kharkiv has roughly 1.five one thousand thousand, Odessa has i one thousand thousand, Dnipro has almost i million, Zaporizhia has 750,000, and even Mariupol has almost 500,000.⁹ If defended, these large urban areas could accept considerable time and casualties to clear and occupy. In the First Chechen War, it took Russian forces from Dec 31, 1994, to Feb nine, 1995, to wrestle command of Grozny, then a city of less than 400,000, from a few thousand Chechen fighters.¹⁰ In the Second Chechen War, the siege of Grozny also took six weeks.

Therefore, the all-time course of activity for Russian troops would be to bypass urban areas and mop them up later. Yet, Kharkiv is just over the border from Russian federation and is a major route and railroad junction. If Russian forces did not control Kharkiv, information technology would seriously diminish their logistical capability to support a primal thrust toward the Dnepr River and across. Furthermore, Kiev poses a similar challenge and, equally the nation'due south capital, possesses great symbolic value for whichever side holds it. Russia may be unable to avoid sustained urban combat in several major metropolitan areas (and the resulting high casualties) if information technology attempts more than than a castigating incursion into Ukraine.

Control and Command: In that location is a Russian expression: "the showtime blini is ever a mess." In the case of an invasion of Ukraine, Russia will be conducting its largest combined arms operation since the Battle of Berlin in 1945. The 2008 Russo-Georgian War saw just five days of combat and engaged 70,000 Russian soldiers.¹¹ In Syria, the primary maneuver forces included Syrian ground units, with aid from Lebanese Hezbollah, militia forces from neighboring countries such as Republic of iraq and Afghanistan, private armed forces companies such as the Wagner Group, and Iran's Islamic Revolutionary Baby-sit Corps-Quds Forces. Just Russia did not deploy significant numbers of conventional forces. Approximately 120,000 Russian soldiers are mobilized almost Ukraine, with tens of thousands more set to deploy into combat.¹² It will be a challenge for Russian command and control to first movement all of these forces into their attack positions with proper march discipline. Information technology will besides be difficult for Russia to maintain that bailiwick during the attack so that the massive amounts of vehicles and soldiers moving on a express number of slippery and poor roads and oft at nighttime do not become 1 gargantuan traffic jam.

The coordination of airborne and amphibious assaults will bear witness some other claiming. While airborne forces could be dropped along the Dnepr River to seize crucial bridges, how long would they be able to agree out while armored forces try to reach them over wintertime roads? The same applies for amphibious forces attempting to outflank Ukrainian defenses near Mariupol or to seize Odessa. Black Sea hydrography and coastal topography provide few skilful landing sites for amphibious forces, and one time landed, they would exist difficult to sustain.¹³ Without proper coordination and rapid advance of armored forces, any airborne or amphibious assail as function of the invasion could go a "bridge or beach too far" for Russian forces. Figures 3a, 3b, and 3c highlight ships from the Russian navy'south Blackness Sea Fleet, including landing ships and corvettes that could be used in an amphibious set on into Ukraine.

Effigy 3a: Sevastopol Bay, Crimea

Figure 3b: Close-Up of Russian Landing Ships in Sevastopol

Figure 3c: Close-Up of Russian Maritime Vessels in Sevastopol

The Russian armed services likewise has limited experience in coordinating a large number of aircraft that will support the basis attack. Russian air operations in Syrian arab republic and Chechnya do not compare with the number of sorties that could be required in Ukraine across a front possibly several hundred miles broad. This will be the first time since Globe War Ii that Russian federation's footing forces volition face a modern mechanized opponent, and its air forces volition face an opponent with a modern air force and air defense system. Consequently, Russian forces will likely face notable challenges in command, command, communications, and coordination.

Logistics: The initial assault volition likely be well supported with artillery and air support, leading to several breakthroughs in Ukrainian defenses. However, once combat units expend their initial stores of ammunition, fuel, and nutrient, the real exam of Russian military strength will begin—including Russia'south ability to sustain the accelerate of a massive mechanized strength over hundreds of miles of territory. Kiev and the Dnepr River crossings are at to the lowest degree 150 to 200 road miles from the Russian border, and its army will crave at least several days of fighting to reach them. Earlier that, they will undoubtedly have to resupply, refuel, and replace gainsay losses of men and material at least once, which will crave an operational suspension.

In his article "Feeding the Conduct," Alex Vershinin argues that at that place are serious logistical challenges to a Russian invasion that is supposed to roll over the Baltic states in 96 hours and present the West with a fait accompli. Russia has built an excellent military machine for fighting most its frontier and striking deep with long-range fires. However, Russia may have trouble with a sustained ground offensive far beyond Russian railroads without a major logistical halt or a massive mobilization of reserves.^xiv As the operational depth in Ukraine is far greater than in the Baltics, a Russian invasion of Ukraine could be a longer thing than some anticipate due to the time and distance to bring up supplies. If the invasion is not concluded quickly due to a combination of conditions, logistics, and Ukrainian resistance, how might this touch on Russian morale?

Morale: There are 2 levels of morale on each side to consider: the morale of individual soldiers and the morale of each country and its people. At the private level, volition a Ukrainian soldier who believes he or she is fighting for their homeland have an reward over a Russian soldier whose motivation for fighting may vary? For the Ukrainian nation equally a whole, how strong is their sense of a unique national identity to resist what could be a long, destructive, and bloody struggle? The answers cannot exist known until the war begins. Nonetheless, should state of war come, i factor influencing morale volition be time. The longer the Ukrainian army resists the Russians, the greater its confidence may grow as well as its institutional knowledge of how to fight this enemy. In addition, the longer the war continues, the greater may be the level of international support and the greater the run a risk of increased arms transfers to assistance plow the tide on the battlefield.

For Russia, the longer the state of war continues and the greater the casualties, the greater the take chances of undermining Russian morale from the level of the bones soldier to Russian society writ large. Approximately one-3rd of Russian ground forces consist of one-yr conscripts.¹⁵ These conscripts serve alongside professional soldiers, or kontraktniki, under a arrangement of hazing known as the dedovshchina. This organisation is infamous for its abuses upward to and including murder, which tin can erode unit cohesion. Additionally, heavy casualties will need quick replacements, and reservists brought to reinforce frontline units have received little recent training. Equally the number of professional soldiers decreases due to casualties, and reservists and conscripts increase on the front line, the chance of poor unit cohesion at the soldier level volition rising. If casualties and even defeats mount, bug of cohesion at the front could be reflected in public unrest at dwelling.

Every Kremlin ruler knows that one of the quickest ways to end a Russian dynasty or regime is to lose a war. While early Soviet assessments of the war in Afghanistan were hopeful, they eventually turned gloomy. At a Politburo meeting on Oct 17, 1985, for example, Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev read messages from Soviet citizens expressing growing dissatisfaction with the war in Afghanistan—including "mothers' grief over the dead and the bedridden" and "center-wrenching descriptions of funerals."¹⁶ As the Soviet war in Transitional islamic state of afghanistan dragged on, the costs—including in blood and coin—were likewise high and outweighed any geostrategic benefits. Over the course of the war, about 15,000 Soviet soldiers were killed, and another 35,000 were wounded.

Russian families are sure to resent their soldiers being used as cannon fodder, and the ubiquitous presence of cell phone cameras and videos in today'south world volition expand soldiers' complaints beyond their units. Therefore, the question for the Kremlin volition exist: the longer the war grinds on and society reacts to casualties and economic duress, how much are their initial objectives worth to them?

The U.South. and Western Response

A Ukraine that is willing to fight for itself is a Ukraine worth supporting. While the Ukraine of 2022 is not a perfect democracy, neither was Poland in 1939 when Britain and French republic decided that their principles and security interests made information technology necessary to draw the line against Nazi aggression along its borders. The fundamental to thwarting Russian ambitions is to foreclose Moscow from having a quick victory and to enhance the economic, political, and military costs by imposing economical sanctions, ensuring political isolation from the West, and raising the prospect of a prolonged insurgency that grinds away the Russian armed forces. In this war, Russian federation might take the watches, but the West and Ukraine may have the time.

Washington's goal should exist to deter Russian conventional operations in Ukraine by punishment—non denial. Deterrence by deprival involves preventing an opponent from taking an activeness, such as seizing territory, past making it infeasible or unlikely to succeed. Absent a major U.South. and European war machine deployment to Ukraine, which President Biden has already ruled out since Ukraine is non a member of NATO, Ukrainian forces cannot prevent a rapid deployment of Russian forces into Ukraine. Deterrence by penalisation, however, involves preventing an opponent from taking an action considering the costs—such as nuclear weapons, economical sanctions, or an insurgency—are besides high. Deterrence by penalization is possible if led past the U.s.. The United States and its European allies and partners should publicly and privately continue to communicate to Moscow that a conventional attack on Ukraine would initiate crippling sanctions from Western countries, deepen Russia's political isolation from the Due west, and trigger a Western-backed insurgency against Russian forces in Ukraine. The United States would have to take the lead. The populations of several European countries, such every bit Germany and Austria, have noted that they would prefer to remain neutral in a state of war with Russia.¹⁷

If deterrence fails and Russian forces invade Ukraine, the Us and its allies and partners should conduct several firsthand steps:

Implement severe economic and financial sanctions against Russia, including cut Russian banks off from the global electronic payment messaging arrangement known every bit SWIFT.

Enact a Twenty-First Century Lend-Lease Act to provide Ukraine with state of war materiel at no cost. Priority items would include air defense, anti-tank, and anti-transport systems; electronic warfare and cyber defense systems; modest artillery and artillery armament; vehicle and aircraft spare parts; petroleum, oil, and lubricants; rations; medical support; and other needs of a military involved in sustained combat. This help could occur through overt ways with the help of U.S. military forces, including special operations, or it could be a covert action authorized by the U.S. president and led by the Key Intelligence Agency.

Provide intelligence to allow Ukraine to disrupt Russian lines of communication and supply, likewise as warning of airborne and amphibious attacks and locations of all major units.

Offer humanitarian support to help Ukraine deal with refugees and internally displaced persons. This assistance may also need to exist extended to NATO allies on Ukraine'south borders for refugees fleeing westward.

Provide economic support, including energy, to Ukraine and NATO allies due to the expected disruption of Russian gas flows to Europe.

Conduct public diplomacy and media broadcasts to Ukraine and globally, including in Russia, to portray accurately what is happening.

Apply diplomatic pressure level on Republic of belarus to deny Russian federation admission to its territory to attack Ukraine. This is critically important considering Russian use of Belarus' rail and road networks would threaten a strategic turning movement of Ukraine'due south northern flank.

Coordinate with nongovernmental organizations and the International Criminal Courtroom to certificate all war crimes inflicted on the Ukrainian people and to demand redress once the war is over. What happened to the Syrian people should not happen again.

The United states of america and NATO should be prepared to offer long-term support to Ukraine's resistance no matter what form it ends up taking. There has already been public debate nearly unconventional warfare support to Ukraine should function or all of Ukraine exist occupied.¹⁸ However, this option must be approached with a clear understanding of what is possible to attain—and what might not be possible. Russia has historically proven expert at destroying armed resistance movements, and given enough time, it can do so again. Its methods confronting a Ukrainian resistance will be swift, direct, and barbarous.¹⁹ Any sanctuary that the resistance uses, whether it is in rump Ukrainian or NATO territory, could be discipline to Russian overt or covert assail. Therefore, it would require the protection of substantial conventional forces to deter Russian actions in NATO territory. Furthermore, any portion of Ukraine'due south border Russia may occupy could quickly resemble the Iron Curtain of the twentieth century, featuring heavy fortifications. The Berlin Wall was a heavily-guarded concrete barrier, which included anti-vehicle trenches, mesh fencing, spinous wire, a bed of nails, and other defenses. It volition be hard to institute supply lines for a resistance across such an obstacle from any sanctuary.

While the Russians have been adept at anti-resistance operations, they are not adept at extinguishing nationalism. Any back up to occupied Ukraine should also include means to maintain Ukrainian's national identity, history, and language among its citizens. While armed resistance would hearken to the 1980s back up provided to the Afghan mujahedin, this type of support to preserve the Ukrainian nation would be more in keeping with the help provided to Polish Solidarity during its struggles for freedom.^xx

In addition, Ukraine could potentially prevent Russia from seizing and holding all or well-nigh of its territory with U.South. and other international help. For case, Ukraine could go on about of its maneuver forces back far enough from initial Russian breakthroughs so that they are not encircled. As Russian forces accelerate westward, Ukraine should gain intelligence to make up one's mind Russia'south chief thrusts, carry deep strikes confronting its supply lines to force them into an operational pause, and once they are stopped, envelop and counterattack them. Cities should hold out as long every bit possible. In the case of Kharkiv, railroads and bridges inside the city should be utterly destroyed prior to capitulation to further degrade Russian lines of communication. If the Russian military approaches the Dnepr River, its multiple dams could exist opened and low-lying areas flooded. Airborne and amphibious assaults should be isolated immediately. Ukraine's goal should be to prevent Russia from making whatever meaning advances earlier the onset of the Rasputitsa, or thaw.

In one case mechanized movement is ground to a halt by mud and supply bug, airborne and amphibious pockets tin exist eliminated, and Ukraine will have had enough time to mobilize and deploy its approximately 900,000-man reserve force. Hopefully, international aid will also begin arriving in the form of weapons systems to preclude Russia from achieving air superiority over Ukraine and assuasive information technology to keep to strike deep into the Russian regular army'southward rear to attrit reinforcements and supply lines. As weeks turn into months, international economic and financial sanctions should brainstorm to take effect. The Kremlin would then exist faced with a long war, on the battlefield and off it, with little end in sight.

A New Fe Mantle

The current state of affairs bears an eerie resemblance to Soviet decisionmaking in 1979 to invade Afghanistan. In that case, a modest coterie in the Politburo made the decision on their ain based on faulty intelligence, poor perceptions of the international environment, overly optimistic scenarios of success, and little comprehension of the international political and economical costs they would face up. A take a chance-versus-reward calculation of Russia achieving its political objectives should discourage it from an invasion. Its best selection would exist to keep to rattle sabers, pursue diplomatic negotiations, and help pro-Russian insurgents in Eastern Ukraine—merely to refrain from a conventional invasion. However, President Putin has made high-profile demands and threats that will be very hard to retreat from. Should miscalculation, emotion, and poor crunch management overcome rational calculations and atomic number 82 to conventional war, the international landscape will likely witness a dramatic change.

In his famous Atomic number 26 Curtain speech on March 5, 1946, British prime minister Winston Churchill spoke darkly that "a shadow has fallen upon the scenes" of Europe that pitted democratic states against authoritarian ones. "From Stettin in the Baltic to Trieste in the Adriatic," Churchill remarked, "an Iron Curtain has descended across the Continent."²¹ A new Iron Drape would exist even more than dangerous—spanning Europe, the Middle E, and Asia and incorporating a new axis of authoritarian regimes that includes Russia, China, Iran, and North Korea. This new dividing line would move along Russia's borders with Finland and the Baltic states forth NATO's eastern flank; cutting through Russian- and Iranian-supported countries in the Middle East and Key Asia, such as Syria and Republic of kazakhstan; and snake along China'southward borders with India through East asia to the South China Body of water. If Russia were to invade Ukraine, the United States and other European states would need to rush soldiers and materiel to NATO's eastern flank—such as Latvia, Lithuania, Estonia, and Poland—in case the Russians threatened to advance westward. Russia might besides try to instigate a crunch in ane or more of the Balkan states to split American and European attention and resources. In Asia, Taiwan would likely exist on warning well-nigh possible Chinese movements to take the isle.

Countries such as Russia and Mainland china admire forcefulness and have piddling respect for weakness—including war machine weakness. Competition could increasingly become a struggle between rival political, economic, and military systems—between authoritarian, state-controlled systems and autonomous ones. The illiberalism at the root of Chinese, Russian, Iranian, and North Korean systems is antithetical to Western Enlightenment values. They eschew freedom of the press, liberty of religion, free markets, and democracy. Equally Thomas Jefferson remarked, "Liberty of faith; freedom of press; and freedom of person. . . . These principles grade the bright constellation, which has gone before us and guided our steps through an age of revolution and reformation."²² They were critical in winning the Common cold War against the Soviet Union, and they are but as important today.

"If the Western Democracies stand up together in strict adherence to the principles of the United Nations lease, their influence for furthering these principles will exist immense and no one is likely to molest them," Churchill remarked in his Iron Mantle spoken language. "If however they become divided or falter in their duty and if these all-important years are allowed to slip abroad then indeed catastrophe may overwhelm us all."²³ Hopefully, reason volition prevail in Moscow, and Russia volition non invade Ukraine. If at that place is an invasion, however, the United States and its allies and partners need to be prepared to resist tyranny.

Philip G. Wasielewski recently retired after a 31-year career as a paramilitary operations officer in the Central Intelligence Agency. Seth G. Jones is senior vice president and manager of the International Security Plan at the Centre for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) in Washington, D.C., and author most recently of Three Dangerous Men: Russia, Cathay, Iran, and the Rise of Irregular Warfare (West.Due west. Norton, 2021).

The authors requite special thanks to Joe Bermudez and Jennifer Jun for their assistance with satellite imagery analysis, as well as to Jared Thompson for his outstanding research assistance. The authors besides thank Jeeah Lee and William Taylor for their infrequent editorial and graphic design support.

This brief is fabricated possible by general support to CSIS. No direct sponsorship contributed to this brief.

CSIS Briefs are produced past the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), a private, tax-exempt institution focusing on international public policy issues. Its research is nonpartisan and nonproprietary. CSIS does not have specific policy positions. Accordingly, all views, positions, and conclusions expressed in this publication should exist understood to exist solely those of the author(south).

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Source: https://www.csis.org/analysis/russias-possible-invasion-ukraine